Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1986

Marlin L. Stewart and Candice Stewart v. Aldine J.
Coffman JR.; Penelope Dalton Coffman, Coffman,
Coffman and Woods : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Tim Dalton Dunn; Hanson, Dunn, Epperson & Smith; Attorneys for Respondent.
Paul W. Mortensen; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stewart v. Coffman, No. 860318 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/218

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
D iCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO.

""_THFl Q"PPg"g COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

faj/f'SS
Case No. 860167
C a t e g o r y No. 1 3 . b .

vs.
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS,
a professional corporation
also known as COFFMAN and
COFFMAN, ANTHONY M. THURBER,
and KENNETH A. OKAZAKI,
jointly and severally,
Defendants.
(PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
Defendant-Respondent)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL
District Judge
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
131 East 100 South
P. O. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532-0339
Telephone: 259-8173
Attorney for Appellant
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
Tim Dalton Dunn
Anne Swensen
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-7611
Attorneys for Respondent

FILED
JUL 161986
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

LIST OF PARTIES
At the time of preparation of this brief the parties to
this action are the same as those listed in the caption, except
that Kenneth A. Okasaki has been voluntarily dismissed from the
action. This appeal only directly involves the Plaintiffs and
the Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman who was dismissed from the
action over the Plaintiffs1 objection.
The Defendants Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. and Coffman,
Coffman and Woods, a professional corporation, who are not
parties to this appeal, are represented by Tim Dalton Dunn and
Anne Swensen who also represent the Defendant-Respondent Penelope
Dalton Coffman in this appeal.
The Defendant Anthony M. Thurber, who is not a party to
this appeal, is represented by Thomas L. Kay, P.O. Box 45385,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385, (801) 532-1500.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
THE COURT COMMITTED
DISMISSING PENELOPE
ACTION SINCE SHE IS
LIABLE FOR THE ACTS
JR

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
D. COFFMAN FROM THE
AND WAS VICARIOUSLY
OF ALDINE J. COFFMAN,
4

CONCLUSION

8

ADDENDUM

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

Page

First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 SE 2d
674, (1983), 39 ALR 4th 551, on remand Zagoria v. Du
Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga App 120, 306 SE 2d 433 .

7

Petition of Bar Asso. 55 Hawaii 121, 516 P.2d 1267 (1973).

5,6

Williams v. Burns, 463 F Supp 1278 (D.C. Colo, 1979)

5

STATUTES CITED
Utah General Partnership Act, Utah Code Annotated,
Title 48-1-1
Utah Professional Corporation Act, Utah Code Annotated
Title 16-11-1

iv

5
1,3,4,6

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 860167

vs.
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS,
a professional corporation
also known as COFFMAN and
COFFMAN, ANTHONY M. THURBER,
and KENNETH A, OKAZAKI,
jointly and severally,
Defendants.
(PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
Defendant-Respondent)
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows:
A.
involved

Are partners
in

a

case

in

a

law

vicariously

firm

who

are not actively

liable

for

the professional

malpractice of other partners in the law firm?
B.
professional

Does

the

structuring of a law firm partnership as a

corporation under the Utah Professional Corporation

Act, Section 16-11-1 et. seq. of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, shield a member of the firm from vicarious liability for

1

the professional malpractice of other members of the firm?
Statement of the Case
This

is

an

appeal

of

the

dismissal

of

Respondent Penelope Dalton Coffman (hereinafter
D.

Coffman")

followed

a

from
Rule

a legal malpractice
12(b)

motion

Defendant-

called "Penelope

action.

The

dismissal

to dismiss which was in

effect

treated as a motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter called "the Stewarts")
brought suit against Penelope D. Coffman, Aldine J, Coffman, Jr.,
Coffman, Coffman & Woods, P.C., and

others

alleging inter alia,

that the Stewarts lost a major lawsuit because of malpractice
the

part

attorneys

of Aldine J. Coffman, Jr.
who had represented them.

as

well

on

as

other

named

The Stewarts,

inter

alia,

alleged that the Coffman defendants had negligently allowed their
counterclaim
properly

to

dismissed

with

prejudice

Eor failure

plead and properly and timely amend when granted

to do so.

time

D.

Coffman

leave

and Aldine J. Coffman, Jr. were at

of the alleged malpractice members of the law firm

Coffman and Coffman, a professional

corporation.

The

by the time the involved suit was filed.
Penelope
against

D.

Coffman

her

filed

a

P.C.,

(R. 1-8, 59-61).
motion

to

for failure to state a cause

2

of

firm name

had subsequently been changed to Coffman, Coffman & Woods,

complaint

to

(R.l-8)i

Penelope
the

be

dismiss
of

the

action

alleging

by

memorandum that she had not personally

the

Stewarts, The

the

ground

that,

memorandum,

motion was initially denied by the court
aside

Penelope

personal

involvement

Penelope

D.

affidavit

professional

unverified

allegations

D. Coffman had not shown that she
in

the

she

matters

admitted

corporation,

involvement
The

from

alleged.

Coffman then filed a motion to

wherein

in

Stewarts

represented

but

representing

possessed

(R.

reconsider

that she was a member

on

in her
had

no

30-58).
and

an

of

the

alleged that she had no personal
the Stewarts.

no evidence to show

Coffman had ever talked to them or

worked

(R. 59-61;
that

70-71).

Penelope

D.

on their case and, on

such basis only, the Court dismissed Penelope D. Coffman from the
lawsuit.
the

(R. 72-74; 135-137).

The dismissal was entered against

Stewarts1 contentions that under the provisions of the

Utah

Professional Corporation Act, Section 16-11-1 et.seq. of the Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Penelope
J.

Coffman,

D.

Coffman and Aldine

Jr. were, in matters of professional

liability

to

clients, partners and, under partnership law, Penelope D. Coffman
was

jointly

and

severally

liable for the actions of Aldine J.

Coffman, Jr. even if she never actively represented the Stewarts.
(R. 35-43) . The Stewarts
dismissal.

thereupon

filed

this

appeal

(R. 138-149). Copies of relevent pleadings

Memorandum Decisions are included in the Addendum.
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and

of the
both

Summary of Argument
Under
vicariously
partners

partnership

law,

partners

law

firms

are

liable for the professionally wrongful acts of other

who

represent

clients

of

the

firm.

The

law

firms

the

by its provisions, does

not

Professional Corporation Act allows lawyers
opportunity

of

to

incorporate,

but,

law
and

Utah

alter the traditional standards of professional liability arising
out

of

the

practice of law including the doctrine of vicarious

liability of law firm members.

Therefore, Penelope D. Coffman is

vicariously liable for the malpractice of Aldine J. Coffman, Jr.
as a de facto partner even though the law firm is structured as a
professional

corporation.

The

trial court committed reversible

error in dismissing her as a defendant.
Argument
THE
COURT
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE
ERROR
IN
DISMISSING PENELOPE D. COFFMAN FROM THE ACTION
SINCE SHE IS AND WAS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE
ACTS OF ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.
Aldine J.

Coffman,

Jr. and Penelope D. Coffman are each

members of the Defendant law firm Coffman, Coffman and
professional
professional

Woods, a

corporation. (R.
24-29;
32-34;
59-61). The
I
corporation, if
it
in fact exists, must be

incorporated under authority of the Utah Professional Corporation
Act, Section 16-11-1 et seq. of the
amended.

4

Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

Prior to the adoption of the Professional Corporation Act
in

1963,

partnerships
law

*

law

firms

subject

necessarily

to

existed

in

the

form

of

the liabilities imposed by partnership

Petition of Bar Asso. 55 Hawaii 121, 516 P.2d 1267

Williams v. Burns, 463 F Supp 1278, (D.C. Colo, 1979).

(1973).
Sections

48-1-10, 11 and 12 of the Utah General Partnership Act f which was
adopted in 1921, provide that the partnership and all partners as
of the date liability arose are jointly and severally liable
the

wrongful

acts

or

omissions

ordinary course of business.

of

any partner acting in the

These sections read as follows:

48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful
act. Where by any wrongful act or omission of
any partner acting in the ordinary course of the
business of the partnership or with the authority
of his copartners loss or injury is caused to any
person, not being a partner in the partnership,
or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is
liable therefor to the same extent as the partner
so acting or omitting to act.
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of
trust. The partnership is bound to make good the
loss:
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of
his apparent authority receives money or property
of a third person and misapplies it; and,
(2) Where the partnership in the course of its
business receives money or property of a third
person and the money or property so received is
misapplied by any partner while it is in the
custody of the partnership.
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability.
All partners are liable:
(1) Jointly
and
severally
for
everything
chargeable' to the partnership under sections 481-10 and 48-1-11.
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for

(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations
of the partnership; but any partner may enter
into
a separate obligation
to
perform
a
partnership contract.
Sections

16-11-3

and 10 of the Professional Corporation

Act state that although the act allows

professionals

the use of

the corporate form for business purposes, the act is not intended
to

alter

the

professional

professional

relationship

between

the

and his client and specifically is not intended

alter any law of liability applicable to the relationship.

to

These

provisions read as follows:
16-11-3. Purpose of act.—This act shall be so
construed as to effectuate its general purpose of
making available to professional persons the
benefits of the corporate form for the business
aspects of their practices while preserving the
established professional aspects of the personal
relationship between the professional person and
those he serves.
16-11-10. Laws as to professional relationships
not altered.—This act does not alter any law
applicable to the relationship between a person
rendering professional services and a person
receiving such services, including
liability
arising out of such professional services.
Therefore,

the

preexisting

status

of law firm members

being vicariously liable for the professional misdeeds
fellow

members

corporations.
Supreme

Court

incorporated

remains
In

to

firms

their

members of professional

Petition of Bar Asso.,

recognized
law

applicable

of

supra,

that the liability

of

the

Hawaii

attorneys

of

for the malpractice of their associates

6

should

not

be limited and that the partnership law of liability

should continue to apply.

Likewise, in First Bank & Trust Co. v.

Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 SE 2d 674, (1983), 39 ALR 4th

551, on

remand, Zagoria v. Du Bose Enterprises, Inc., 167 Ga App 120, 306
SE

2d

lawyer

433, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously

held

who holds himself out as a member of a law firm,

it is a partnership or a professional corporation, is
the

professional

when

that

the

misconduct

of

a

whether

liable for

other members of the firm even

lawyer has had no involvement in the transaction which

gave rise to the liability.

The court appropriately stated:

The professional nature of the law practice and
its obligations to the public interest require
that each lawyer be civilly responsible for his
professional acts. A lawyer's relationship to
his client is a very special one. So also in the
relationship between a lawyer and the other
members of his or her firm a special one. When a
client engages the services of a lawyer the
client has the right to expect the fidelity of
other members of the firm. It is inappropriate
for the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek
in the shadows and folds of the corporate veil
and
thus
escape
the
responsibilities
of
professionalism.

We cannot allow a corporate veil to hang from the
cornices of professional
corporations
which
engage in the law practice.
Therefore, Penelope
liable

for

the

acts

of

D. Coffman is jointly and severally
Aldine

J.

Coffman,

Jr.

and

the

professional corporation even if she was not directly involved in

7

representing the Plaintiffs*

The trial court's dismissal

of her

from the action must be reversed.
Conclusion
The trial

court's

dismissal

from the action must be reversed.
has

been

tried

before

this

entered

against

Aldine

In the event that

appeal

Coffman should be ordered subject

of Penelope Dalton Coffman

to

the

action

is

heard Penelope Dalton

and

bound by any judgment

J. Coffman, Jr. and/or the professional

corporation.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1986.

-:

SSZ>£-?S&ZT*Z-~-.

PAUL W. MORTENSEN
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ADDENDUM

CONTENTS
Complaint
Motion To Dismiss Penelope Dalton Coffman
Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman's Reply To Plaintiffs'
Memorandum In Opposition To Her Motion To Dismiss
Ruling On Motion To Dismiss
Affidavit Of Penelope Dalton Coffman
Motion To Reconsider
Ruling On Motion To Reconsider Motion To Dismiss

NOTE:
A copy of the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Penelope Dalton Coffman (R. 35-43) is not
herein included because its relevant content is essentially the
same as that set forth in Plaintiffs' Argument herein. Also to
avoid repetition, only the defendant's reply memorandum is set
forth and the defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (R. 32-34) is not included in this addendum.
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PAUL W. MORTENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
131 East 100 South
P. 0. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (301) 259-8173
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wi fe,

CIVIL NO.

Plai nt i ffs,
COMPLAINT
vs.
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS,
a professional corporation
also known as COFFMAN and
COFFMAN, ANTHONY M. THURBER,
and KENNETH A. OKAZAKI,
jointly and severally,
Defendants.
COME NOW

the

above

Plaintiffs and for causes of action

allege:
Preliminary Allegations
1.

The

Plaintiffs

(both

hereinafter

called

"the

Stewards"), are residents of Grand County, State of Utah.
2.

The Defendants

Aldine

J.

Dalton Coffman are and were at relevant
to

practice

law

in

Coffman, Jr. and Penelope
times attorneys licensed

the State of Utah, residing in Moab, Grand

1

County, State of Utah.
3.
Dalton

The Defendants

Aldine

J.

Coffman, Jr. and P'enelope

Coffman are members of the Defendant

Coffman

and

Woods, a professional

law

corporation

firm
also

Coffman,
known

as

Coffman and Coffman, which law firm has its office in Moab, Grand
County, State of Utah.
Penelope

Dalton

The Defendants

Coffman

and

Aldine

J.

Coffman, Coffman

Coffman, Jr.,
and

Woods

are

jointly referred to hereinafter as "Coffman".
4.

The Defendant

Anthony

M.

Thurber

is

and

was

relevant times an attorney licensed to practice law in the
of

Utah, practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah.

A. Okazaki is also an attorney licensed
State

of

Stewarts.
5.

Utah,

who

to

Defendant

practice

undertook with Thurber

to

at

State
Kenneth

law in the

represent

the

Said Defendants are both hereinafter called "Thurber".
The Defendants

are

jointly and severally liable for

the damages suffered by the Stewarts as herein after set forth.
6.

On or/about

June

3,

1981,

the

Stewarts

defendants were each served with a Complaint and Summons

as named
in

the

matter of Canyon Homesteads, Inc., a Utah Corporation, as trustee
for the Ticaboo Townsite Joint Venture, Plaintiffs, vs. Marlin J.
Stewart and Candice Stewart, Defendants, in
District Court in Garfield County,

State

of

the

Sixth

Utah,

Judicial

hereinafter

called "The Canyon Homesteads suit."
7.

The Canyon

Homesteads

2

suit

was

based upon amounts

'that Canyon Homes Leads alleged was owing by the Stewarts for rent,
and

other

Canyon

expenses

arising

from a sublease agreement

Homesteads as sublessor and

regarding

the

Stewarts

as

between
sublessee

a grocery store in Ticaboo, Garfield County Utah.

The

Stewarts possessed a claim against Canyon Homesteads, and against
Plateau

Resources,

mi srepresentation
claim

exceeded

claim

of

the

compensatory
was

based

Inc.
and/or

the

for

i ntenti onal

amount

Stewarts

breach

of

exceeded

of

warranty,

mi srepresentation

whi ch

Canyon Homesteads' claim.
three

million

damages arid punitive damages.
upon

negligent

Said

dollars

The Stewart's

for
claim

false representations made by Carjyon Homesteads

officials that the planned town of Ticaboo would absolutely
at least. 1,500 residents who would patronize the
Said untrue representation wrongly induced
into

the

Ticaboo

sublease

and

act

to

grocery

have
store.

the Stewarts to enter

their detriment.

The town

thereafter failed to establish a significant

and the Stewarts' grocery store business in Ticaboo

of

population
and in Moab,

Utah therefore failed.
8.
and

to

In order

assert

to defend against the Canyon Homestead suit

their

claim

for damages the Stewarts

retained

Coffman who undertook to represent: the Stewarts.
9.
counterclaim
against

On November

19,

1981 Coffman filed an answer, and a

against Canyon Homesteads, Inc. arid a

Plateau Resources, Ltd. who Coffman named

3

"crossclai in"
as

a

"Third

Party Do Cendant . "
10.

On December

4,

1981

Canyon

Homesteads,

Inc.

and

Plateau Resources moved to dismiss the Stewarts1 counterclaim and
"crossclaim" because

of

Coffman's

failure

to plead a cause of

action and to otherwise follow appropriate rules of court,
11.

On June

25,

motion

and

dismissed

ruling

that

Coffman

and

procedure.

1982

the

presiding

judge granted the

the Stewarts' counterclaim and crossclaim
had failed to follow the rules of pleading

The

court grantee] the Stewarts twenty

days

to

file proper pleadings.
12.
within

Coffman

the

thereafter

failed

to file proper pleadings

time allowed, faiLed to take proper steps to protect

the Stewarts' right to assert their defenses arid counterclaim and
"crossclaim" and allowed

the court to dismiss the Stewarts claim

with prejudice.
13.
protected

When
and

the
was

Stewarts
not

Thuuber to represent them.
the

necessary

steps

to

learned

protecting

failed

allowed

the

dismissed
entered

had

not

Thurber agreed

to

immediately

take

save the Stewarts defenses and claims.
to

protect the Stewarts'

to file an amended counterclaim and "crossclaim"

Defendants'

with

Coffman

their rights, they retained

However, Thurber in fact took no steps
rights,

that

and "crossclaim"

to

be

prejudice and allowed a summary judgment

to

be

amount

of

uncontested

counterclaim

against

the

4

Stewarts

in

the

$25,740.85 with interest

thereon

at

the rate of 18 percent per

annum.
14.

The Stewarts

were

thereafter

subjected to writs of

execution and compelled to surrender to Canyon Homesteads

a note

and security agreement valued over $66,000.00 in order to satisfy
the

judgment

and to also pay attorneys fees arid other expenses,

necessary to negotiate the settlement.
First Cause of Action
15.

The Stewarts

16.

Coffman

hereby

incorporate paragraph 1 through

14.

defenses
and

and

learning

owed

the

Stewarts the duty to assert their

claims with the reasonable care, skill,
expected of the average lawyer.

Coffman

diligence
breached

said duty in the following alternative ways, each of which

was a

proximate cause of the below-alleged damages to the Stewarts:
a.

Coffman

was negligent in failing to properly and

adequately
claims

plead

against

the
Canyon

Stewarts'

defenses

Homesteads,

arid

Inc.

and

Plateau Resources, Inc. and other parties.
b.

Coffman

was

negligent in failing to timely file

amended pleadings when granted leave to so do.
c.

Coffman

was

negligent

in

not

protecting

the

Stewarts' rights in the course of his withdrawing
as counsel for the Stewarts

5

and

in

withdrawing

before he had protected the Stewarts rights.
17,

As a result of the negligent conduct of Coffman, the

Stewarts suffered the following damages which

they

are entitled

to recover from Coffman:
a.

Loss

of

note

and

security

agreement for over

$66,682.53 plus accruing interest used to satisfy
judgment.
b.

$1,570.93

paid

to

attorneys

and

appraiser in

order to negotiate settlement of the judgment.
c.

Not

less

value

of

than $3,000,000.00 for the loss of the
the

Stewarts' claims

against

Canyon

Homesteads, Inc. and Plateau Resources.
d.

$500,000,00

for

emotional

from loss of the Stewarts'

execution

and

being

resulting

right to their day in

court, resulting from the
and resulting from being

suffering

loss

of

their claims

subjected

compelled

to
to

writs of
pay

the

judgment.
e.

Not less than $1,000.00 for attorneys fees paid
to Coffman.

f.

Other damages to be proven at trial.
Second Cause of Action

18.

The Stewarts hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through

17.

6

19,
assert

their

diligence
breached
which

The

and
said

Defendant • Thurber

ov/ed the Stewarts a duty to

defenses and claims with reasonable

care,

learning expected of the average lawyer,
duty in the following alternative ways,

skill,
Thurber
each

of

was a proximate cause of the Stewarts damages as set forth

herein.
a.

Thurber

was negligent in failing to properly and

adequately

plead

the

Stewarts'

claims against Canyon Homesteads,

defenses
Inc.,

and

Plateau

Resources, Inc. and other parties.
b.

Thurber

was

negligent

in

assert and plead a motion
dismissing

the

failing

to prox^erly

to set aside the order

Stewarts' claim

against

Canyon

Homesteads, Inc. and Plateau Resources.
c.

Thurber

was

negligent

in not responding to the

motion for summary judgment
summary

judgment

to

be

and

in allowing the

entered

against

the

Stewarts by default.
d.

Thurber
assert

was
and

negligent
plead

in

a motion

failing
to

set

to properly
aside

the

default summary judgment.
e.

Thurber

was

negligent in failing to immediately

enter his appearance as counsel in the case.
20.

As a

result of the negligent conduct of Thurber the

7

Stewarts

suffered f.ho damages set forth in paragraph 17 above.
WHEREFORE,

the Stewarts are entitled to judgment against

the above Defendants jointly and severally in the sum of not leathan

$3,569,253.46

as set forth above, for their costs of cour

and for such other relief as the court may deem just.
DATED this

^L?

day of November, 1985.

PAUL W. MORTENSEN

Plaintiffs' Address
61 East 200 South
Moab, Utah HIV)?.
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman,
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

VS.

)

ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS,
a professional corporation,
aka COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI,
jointly and severally,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

MOTION TO DISMISS
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN

Civil No.

)

COMES NOW the defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman and moves
the Court for an Order dismissing her as a defendant in the
above-entitled lawsuit on the basis that the plaintiffs'
Complaint against her fails to state a cause of action upon which
relief can be granted.

DATED this

•£*
7&"-

day of December, 19*85).
HANSON,/bUMN, EPPERSON & SMITH

TIM DALTON DUNN
Attorney for Plaintiff
Penelope Dalton Coffman
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing
this

JU"^ day of

U$S/^XM<<LS

, 1985, to:

Paul W. Mortensen
Attorney for Plaintiffs
131 East 100 South
P.O. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532-0339

tfCf/sjfes \/*//v+-^
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936
ANNE SWENSEN, Bar #4252
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone : (801) 363-7611

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS,
a professional corporation,
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. ORAZAKI,
jointly and severally,

DEFENDANT PENELOPE COFFMAN'S
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS1
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
HER MOTION TO DISMISS
Civil NO.

Defendants.

DEFENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, replies to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition to her Motion to Dismiss as
follows:

POINT I
DEPENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN HAS
ENGAGED IN NO CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO
A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HER
Although in their Memorandum in Opposition to this
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' point out that Penelope
Dalton Coffman is referred to as "Coffman"/ along with other
defendants, plaintiffs have made no specific allegations of
conduct on the part of Penelope Dalton Coffman which has resulted
in detriment to the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs have made blanket

allegations of negligence but have not specified which acts or
omissions were engaged in by which individuals.

Defendant

Penelope Dalton Coffman did not at any time engage in the
representation of the plaintiffs and cannot be personally liable
in the absence of specific actions on her part which give rise to
a cause of action against her.

See supplemental affidavit of

Penelope Dalton Coffman.
POINT II
MEMBERSHIP IN A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
DOES NOT EXPOSE A MEMBER TO LIABILITY FOR
THE ACTS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CORPORATION
Defendant Penelope Dalton Coffman has admitted that she
is a member of the defendant law firm Coffman, Coffman & Woods,
and that the defendant law firm is a professional corporation.

-2-

Plaintiffs1 rely on language of the Utah General
Partnership Act to allege that a member of a professional
corporation is jointly and severally liable for the wrongful acts
or omissions of any partner acting in the ordinary course of
business.

Coffman, Coffman & Woods is not a partnership; it is a

professional corporation.
Plaintiffs cite language from the Professional
Corporation Act allowing professionals the use of the corporation
form for business purposesf while not altering the professional
relationship between the professional and his client.

This

defendant points out that the language of the Statute
specifically states that the act "does not alter any law
applicable to the relationship between a person rendering
professional services and a person receiving such services/
including liability arising out of such professional services."
(emphasis added)

There is no

mention of a relationship with or

liability of other members of a corporation.

The emphasis is on

liability of a person rendering professional services to a person
receiving such services.
Section 16-11-5 of the Professional Corporation Act
reads as follows:
The Utah Business Corporation Act shall
be applicable to professional corporations/
and they shall enjoy the powers and
privileges and be subject to the dutiesf
restrictions and liabilities of other
corporations/ except where inconsistent with
this act.

-3-

There is no section of the Utah Professional Corporation Act
purporting to apply the provisions of the Utah General Partnership
Act.
The Utah Business Corporation Actf which is applicable to
the Utah Professional Corporation provides that shareholders are
under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors other than
the obligation to pay the full consideration for shares issued.
16-10-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
The general law of corporations provide that corporate
officers are jointly and severally liable only when two or more
join or participate in a wrongful act.

Directors are not liable

for the wrongful acts of their co-directors if they do no connive
with themf nor are the executive officers responsible for the
neglect of duty, negligencef or misconduct of each other in their
official relations, without proof of joint participation.
18B AM JUR 2d §§1719, 1720.
CONCLUSION
Members of a professional corporation are not vicariously
*liable for the acts or omissions of other members of the
corporation without proof of joint participation.

Because

Penelope Dalton Coffman did not undertake to represent the
plaintiffs, the Complaint, as it relates to her as a named
defendant, should be dismissed, without prejudice.

-4-

DATED this

/^

day of January, 1986.
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH

!IM DALTON DUNN
ANNE SWENSEN
Attorneys for Aldine J. Coffman,
Penelope Dalton Coffman, and
Coffman, Coffman & Woods

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this
(••->

day of January, 1986, a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing to:
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
131 East 100 South
P.O. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532-0339
V

T
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY,
STATE OP UTAH
MARLIN L. STEWART and CANDICE
STEWART, Husband and Wife,

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
V.
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN and WOODS,
a professional corporation,
aka COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. OKAZAKI, jointly
and severally,
Defendants.

Civil No. 5370

In this case the Defendant, PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
has filed a motion to dismiss the case as to her on the ground
that this Defendant had no personal involvement in the matters
alleged in the Complaint.
The Motion is supported by a memorandum that argues
the point, but there are no facts presented from which the
Court can find as matter of undisputed fact that this Defendant,
contrary to the allegations of the Complaint, had not personal
involvement in the matters alleged,
THEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss as to this Defendant
is denied.

.
DATED this

/ ~) day of January, 1986.

(TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936
ANNE SWENSEN, Bar #4252
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone : (801) 363-7611

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife,
Plaintiffs,

:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN

:

vs.

:

ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
[PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS,
a professional corporation,
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. OKAZARI,
jointly and severally,

:

Civil No.

:
:
:

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH )
: ss
GRAND COUNTY

)

PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN, being first duly sworn, on oath
deposes and says:

1. Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law in
the State of Utah.
2.

Affiant is a member of the law firm Coffman, Coffman

3.

The law firm Coffmanf Coffman & Woods is a

& Wood*

professional corporation.
4.

Affiant has not at any time undertaken to represent

Marlin L. Stewart or Candice Stewart in any matter.
5.

Affiant has not corresponded at any time with the

Stewarts, or either of them, with regard to any legal matter.
6.

Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, affiant never

saw the file, never knew the contents of the file, never
discussed with any other member of the lawfirm the contents of
the file, and cannot contribute any information through
discovery, having no personl knowedge of any of the events
leading up to the filing of this lawsuit.
DATED this

ib

day of January, 1986.

PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN

-2-

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this

///y'fjt\

day of

Januaryf 1986.

NtfTARY PUBLIC
Res iding

*tj)wa]tf IfijQbL

My Commission Expires:

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this
day of January, 1986f a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing to:
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
131 East 100 South
P.O. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532-0339

gOM/jOCLS
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TIM DALTON DUNN, Bar #0936
ANNE SWENSEN, Bar #4252
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants
Aldine J. Coffman, Penelope Dalton Coffman
& Coffman, Coffman and Woods
650 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone : (801) 363-7611

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, Husband
and Wife,
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

Civil No. 5370

ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN,
COFFMAN, COFFMAN AND WOODS,
a professional corporation,
a/k/a COFFMAN and COFFMAN,
ANTHONY M. THURBER, and
KENNETH A. OKAZARI,
jointly and severally,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT PENELOPE DALTON COFFMAN moves the court to
reconsider its ruling on her Motion to Dismiss.

The court denied this defendant's Motion to Dismiss on
January 15r 1986. That ruling was apparently made prior to the
court's receipt of this defendant's Reply Memorandum and
supporting Affidavit.
This defendant therefore respectfully requests that the
court reconsider its Motion to Dismiss/ including the Reply
Memorandum and Affidavit currently on file herein.
DATED this

^

day of Januaryr 1986.

HANSON/ DUNN/ EPPERSON & SMITH

M_
ANNE SWENSEN

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed postage prepaid this
- f-)M -

day of January/ 1986/ a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing to:
Paul W. Mortensen, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
131 East 100 South
P.O. Box 339
Moabf Utah 84532-0339
C^&hr*\
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
MARLIN L. STEWART and
CANDICE STEWART, husband
and wife,
Plaintiffs,

)

RULING ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER MOTION
TO DISMISS

vs.
1
ALDINE J. COFFMAN, JR.,
ET AL. ,
Defendants.

Civil No. 5370

]
]

The defendant, Penelope Dalton Coffman, has
previously filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as to her,
and the Court ruled on the motion the same day that a reply to
the response of the plaintiff resisting the motion was mailed
to the Court.

Because of the uncertainty of time deliveries of

the U.S. Postal Department, the Court will reconsider its prior
ruling based upon the matters contained in defendant's reply
memorandum.
The undisputed facts show that Coffman, Coffman and
Woods was a professional corporation and that although the
defendant, Penelope Coffman, is a member of that corporation,
she had no personal professional involvement in the matters
alleged in plaintiffs1 complaint.

The Court concludes as a

matter of law from those undisputed facts that there is no
cause of action against this defendant.

THEREFORE/ the motion to dismiss this action as to
Penelope Dalton Coffman is granted and the attorney for her is
directed to prepare a formal order in accordance with this
decision.
DATED this

<^z/

da

Y

of

January, 1986.

-Page 2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Served the
by

foregoing Brief this / y

day of July, 1986,

mailing four copies thereof, postage prepaid, to

counsel

of record, Tim Dalton Dunn and Anne Swensen,

Learning

Office Center, 175 South West Temple,

Utah 84101.

Salt

defendant's
650

Clark

Lake

City,

